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Abstract 
Poland engaged in a “self-limiting” revolution in 1989 in which it began a process of changing both its economic 
and its political systems. In this context, governmental and party politics came to the forefront in efforts to effect 
real change in society as the “closed” communist system came to an abrupt end. This paper is a study of 
governmental structures and party politics in Poland as they relate to these changes. It discusses the Polish 
legislative, presidential (executive), and judicial systems and the current political configurations operating within 
Poland. The author offers commentary on what the future may hold for politics in a nation still struggling to define 
its role in the European Union in light of its most recent past.  
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Part I – Governmental Structure 
1. Introduction 
Over these past thirty-five years, I have joined with several of my colleagues at Seton Hall University and 
elsewhere to write about various aspects of Polish economics, taxation, society, finance, and politics. [See 
Appendix I for full chronological bibliographic references.] Part I of this primer will focus on the governmental 
structure of Poland. Part II will focus on Poland’s current political configurations and groupings. In conclusion, I 
will provide commentary on the future of politics in Poland. 
 
2. Governmental Structures 
The government of Poland may be viewed from the perspective of a “unitary semi-presidential representative 
democratic-republic" governed by both a President (Polish: Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, shorter form, 
Prezydent RP) and a Prime Minister (Polish: Prezes Rady Ministrów). The President of Poland is the Head of State 
and the Prime Minister is the Head of Government. At present, the President is Andrzej Duda, elected in 2015, 
and the Prime Minister is Mateusz Morawiecki, who took office in 2017.  
Executive power is exercised in Poland within the framework of a multi-party political system by the 
President and the government, which consists of the Council of Ministers (Polish: Rada Ministrów 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) (similar to the Cabinet in the U.S. system), led by the Prime Minister. The members of 
the Council of Ministers are typically chosen from the majority party or governing coalition in the lower house of 
parliament (Polish: the Sejm), although there may be exceptions under Poland’s rather unique governmental system. 
The government is formally announced by the President, and must pass a motion of confidence (considered as an 
approval) in the Sejm within two weeks of the conclusion of a parliamentary election in order to take office. 
Legislative power is vested in the two chambers of Parliament (Marchuk, 2018): the Sejm, consisting of 460 
members elected in multi-person districts and presided over by a speaker called the "Marshal of the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland" (Polish: Marszałek Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej), and a one hundred-member Senate 
(Polish: Senat). Since 1991, elections in Poland are supervised by the National Electoral Commission (Polish: 
Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza), whose administrative division is called the National Electoral Office (Polish: 
Krajowe Biuro Wyborcze). 
Election for the Sejm is through “open party-list proportional representation” in multi-seat constituencies, 
with a 5% national threshold for single parties and an 8% threshold for party coalitions (requirements may be 
waived for specially designated “ethnic minorities,” although it should be recognized that Poland is one of the 
most homogeneous countries in the world, with 97% of its population being “ethnic” Polish). The major ethnic 
minority groups recognized by the Polish government are German, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Lemko, Roma, and 
ethnic Jews. 39.5% of the ethnic minorities live in the Silesian Voivodship, 28.3% in the Opolskie Voivodship, 
and 11.7% in the Podlaskie Voivodship. (A Voidvodship is an administrative region or province of Poland, 
governed by a Voivode, a position similar to that of a Governor. Poland is divided in 16 provinces or Voivodeships 
(Polish: województwa, singular – województwo): Lower Silesia, Kuyavia-Pomerania, Łódź, Lubelskie, Lubusz, 
Lesser Poland, Masovia, Opole, Subcarpathia, Podlaskie, Pomerania, Silesia, Świętokrzyskie, Warmia-Masuria, 
Greater Poland, and West Pomerania.)  
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At present, the following standing committees exist in the Sejm which are responsible for preparing 
legislation under the direction of the Prime Minister: 
• Administration and Internal Affairs 
• Agriculture and Rural Development 
• Liaison with Poles Abroad 
• Constitutional Accountability 
• Culture and Media 
• Deputies' Ethics 
• Economic Committee 
• Education, Science and Youth 
• Enterprise Development 
• Environment Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 
• European Union Affairs 
• Family and Women Rights 
• Foreign Affairs 
• Health 
• Infrastructure 
• Justice and Human Rights 
• Legislative 
• Local Self-Government and Regional Policy 
• National and Ethnic Minorities 
• National Defense 
• Physical Education and Sport 
• Public Finances 
• Rules and Deputies' Affairs 
• Social Policy 
• Special Services 
• State Control 
• State Treasury 
• Work 
The Senate is elected using “first-past-the-post voting" (or “winner-take-all”) in single-member districts. To 
be included on a ballot, a candidate for the Senate must present 2,000 valid signatures of support from their 
constituents. For elections to the Sejm, the threshold is 5,000 signatures per electoral constituency. This 
requirement is waived for parties that have already registered lists in at least half of all constituencies (21 out of 
41, as of the 2019 parliamentary elections). 
Members of the Sejm are elected in a system of proportional representation. Currently five political parties 
are represented in the Sejm:  PiS—235 seats; PO—134 seats; Left—49 seats; Polish Coalition—30 seats; 
Confederation—11 seats; and the German Minority—1 seat. Parliamentary elections occur at least every four years, 
unless the Sejm is dissolved and early elections are called. 
The President of Poland is the Head of State. Under the Polish Constitution of 1997 (Granat & Granat, 2019), 
the President is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. As such, the President appoints the Chief of the 
General Staff (Polish: Szef Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego) and commanders of the branches of the Armed 
Forces. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (Polish: Siły Zbrojne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, abbreviated 
SZ RP; popularly called Wojsko Polskie in Poland, abbreviated WP—roughly, the "Polish Military") are the 
Wojska Lądowe (Polish Land Forces), Marynarka Wojenna (Polish Navy), Siły Powietrzne (Polish Air Forces), 
Wojska Specjalne (Polish Special Forces) and Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej (Polish Territorial Defense Force) 
which are under the command of the Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Ministry of 
National Defense of Poland).  
The President has the power to veto legislation passed by parliament, which then may be overridden by a 
three-fifths majority of both houses of the Parliament. The President can dissolve the parliament under certain 
conditions specified in the Constitution. 
The President, as the representative of the Polish state in foreign affairs, has the authority to ratify and 
renounce international agreements, appoint and recall the plenipotentiary (diplomatic) representatives of the 
Republic of Poland, and is required to cooperate with the Prime Minister and the appropriate minister in respect 
to matters relating to foreign policy. 
Under certain circumstances, the President may convene a body called the Cabinet Council, although the 
Cabinet Council does not possess the competence or powers of the Council of Ministers. Official acts of the 
President require the signature (effectively the concurrence) of the Prime Minister for their validity. However, the 
signature of the Prime Minister is not required under the following circumstances: 
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1. Nominating and appointing the Prime Minister; 
2. Shortening of the term of office of the Sejm in the instances specified in the Constitution; 
3. Introducing legislation; 
4. Requesting the Sejm to appoint the President of the National Bank of Poland; 
5. Appointing judges 
6. Proclaiming the holding of a nationwide referendum (however, consent of the Senate is 
required to do so); 
7. Signing or refusing to sign a bill; 
8. Exercising the power of pardon; and 
9. Convening the Cabinet Council.   
In addition, the concurrence of the Prime Minister was not required in appointing the first President of the 
Supreme 
Court, the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, members of the Council for Monetary Policy, or 
appointing and dismissing members of the National Security Council. 
Presidential elections occur every five years. The President is elected by a majority of voters. However, if no 
candidate receives the required majority in a first round of voting, the top two candidates will participate in a 
second round or runoff election. 
The political system is defined in the Polish Constitution, the most recent of which was adopted in 1997. The 
Constitution guarantees a wide range of individual freedoms and rights to Polish citizens. An important part of the 
judicial branch is the Constitutional Tribunal.  
The Constitutional Tribunal (Polish: Trybunał Konstytucyjny) is the constitutional court of the Republic of 
Poland. The Constitutional Tribunal was established to resolve disputes concerning the constitutionality of the 
activities of state institutions and to supervise the compliance of statutory law with the Constitution. 
When sitting in a joint legislative session, members of the Sejm and Senate form the National Assembly 
(Polish: Zgromadzenie Narodowe). The National Assembly is constituted on three occasions: taking the oath of 
office by a new President; bringing an indictment against the President of the Republic to the Tribunal of State; 
and the necessity of the declaration of a President's permanent incapacity to exercise their duties due to the state 
of their health. 
 
Part II – A Brief Précis of Polish Politics 
3. Polish Politics 
Since 1989, Poland has operated under a multi-party political system. Individual parties have traditionally worked 
with other parties to form electoral coalitions. Before initiating a discussion of the major political parties and 
configurations operating in Poland today, a discussion of some general background is in order (generally Pronczuk, 
2019).   
The political transition from a centralized mono-party communist regime dominated by the Polish United 
Workers (or Communist) Party (Sulek, 2007; Ostrowski, 2019) and several of its smaller counterparts to a “liberal 
democracy,” decentralization (Sakowitz, 2017), and political pluralism resulted in new political parties literally 
mushrooming in the early 1990s (Lewis, 2007). In fact, as Millard (1994) noted: “The first fully competitive 
parliamentary elections in 1991 confirmed this fragmentation, as deputies from twenty-nine electoral committees 
took their seats in the Lower House.” (Most interesting among the new competitors was the Polish Beer-Lovers' 
Party (Poland: Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa), led by a popular comedy actor, Janusz Rewinski, of which the 
author joined as an honorary, yet somehow dues paying member!). The existence of a plethora of parties in the 
Sejm was seen by many as counterproductive to the effectiveness of the parliamentary system, as an impediment 
to producing stable, sustainable governments, and to a veritable parade of Polish Prime Ministers. [See Appendix 
II for a list of the Prime Ministers of Poland since 1989.]  
As a result, “electoral reform” was undertaken and an electoral threshold for the Sejm was instituted prior to 
the 1993 elections. The threshold for representation in the Sejm was set at a minimum vote of 5% for parties (with 
exemptions for ethnic minority parties) and 8% for electoral coalitions. The threshold was set at the national, rather 
than at individual district levels. As a result, many minor parties and independent candidates failed to win election 
in the 1993 parliamentary elections and in later elections as well.  
Fundamental and far reaching economic and political changes were initiated post-1989 period, which on the 
economic side were referred to as “shock therapy.” Marvin (2010) describes these changes initiated under the 
“Balcerowicz Plan” (Hunter & Ryan, 2009) as:  
“a drastic neoliberal package of liberalizing economic reforms that Poland quickly adopted as it 
emerged from Soviet domination. While shock therapy was an effective response to communist 
Poland’s economic deadlock, it did come with high short term costs that could have been avoided. 
Poland’s transition to the market economy after its political liberalization in 1989 is generally 
regarded as one of the most successful transitions of all post-Soviet economies. Despite its 
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unnecessarily rushed introduction, shock therapy was successful because it was the right policy 
set at the right time for Poland.”  
The program was based on five philosophical pillars of economic transformation:  
 Rapid transformation of the monocentric system of state central planning into a private 
functioning market economy;  
 Liberalization of economic functions, especially in relation to foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment;  
 Privatization of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs);   
 Construction of an effective social safety net; and  
 Mobilization of international financial assistance to support the process. 
Fafara and Kleczkowska (2015, p. 60) point out that the Balcerowicz Plan was an “ambitious process that 
enabled a significant shift in the economic and social landscape through the introduction of fundamental changes 
in the Polish legal system.” They describe the eleven legislative acts which brought “wide ranging and fundamental 
changes to the Polish legal system” and make a more general point that “successful transformation of the state’s 
regime in post-soviet countries depended not only on political changes, but also on effective economic reforms.”    
Yet, Marvin (2010) continues: “The economic revolution sparked a deep and unanticipated recession that the 
architects of shock therapy were not prepared to address.” The economic uncertainty and even turmoil experienced 
in society certainly spilled over into Polish politics.    
 
3.1 “Left” versus “Center Right” versus “Right”   
On the political side, the “left side” of the political scene in Poland has generally been dominated by former 
members of the communist party, who have now embraced the philosophy of traditional Western European social 
democrats. [Social democracy may be defined as a “political, social and economic philosophy that supports 
economic and social interventions to promote social justice within the framework of a liberal democratic policy 
and a capitalist-oriented economy” (see generally Dorrien, 2019)]. 
Also, since the early 1990’s, the political “right” has been largely comprised of former Solidarity activists 
and its supporters (Hunter & Lozada, 2019). However, almost from the outset (perhaps stemming from the “War 
at the Top” which occurred between the supporters of Solidarity hero, Lech Walesa (Engelberg, 1990), and the 
supporters of the Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the Presidential elections of 1990), post-Solidarity parties 
on the political “right” have certainly experienced deep fissures and divisions and a lack of cohesiveness and have 
on occasion merged, split, be renamed, and repurposed with the vagaries of Polish politics and economics. Perhaps 
due to the weakness or unpopularity or collapse of the “left,” parties of the “right” did manage to win parliamentary 
elections from 1997-2001, having initially governed from 1989–1993. 
Following the parliamentary elections of 2005, parties on the right have certainly dominated the political 
scene. Two important developments in the political landscape may account for this dominance. First, the SLD or 
Democratic Left Alliance (Polish: Sojusz Lewica Demokratycznej) is no longer a major political player in Poland. 
Second, the main political battleground in Poland now stands between the ex-Solidarity “hard-right” versus the 
more “center-right.” However, Solidarity (Polish: Solidarnosc), as an independent political party, has virtually 
disappeared from the Polish political scene (Hunter & Lozada, 2019).  
The new competing groupings in Poland today on the “right” and “center-right” are Law and Justice (Polish: 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), or PiS, which generally promotes economic interventionism and redistributionism 
(Rzegocki & Partyka, 2017) by the state, coupled with deep social conservatism; and Civic Platform (Polish: 
Platforma Obywatelska), or PO, which has been characterized as “representing a more liberal-conservative 
position” (see Gabryszak, 2019). Perhaps this obvious internal inconsistency of combining terms such as “liberal” 
and “conservative” as a foundation of party policy has led to some confusion and to a general belief that the PO is 
more well-known for its opposition to the policies of PiS rather than any fundamental policy perspectives of its 
own. 
The following is a more detailed look    
 
3.2 Law and Justice (PiS) 
PiS was successful in the 2015 parliamentary elections pledging to “bring Poland up from its knees” and “give 
back dignity to the people" (Pronczuk, 2019). PiS finds its core base in eastern Poland “among small, pious farmers 
and working-class families who have lost jobs and income through the change from a state economy to an often 
ruthless neoliberalism” (Ascherson, 2016).  
The policies of PiS have been subjected to withering criticisms. “Almost immediately, the PiS introduced a 
series of supposed "judicial reforms" which were heavily criticized by Brussels ("The European Union") and the 
PO. Opponents characterized proposals as an attempt to limit the judiciary’s independence,” stated Scislowska 
(2017). Ascherson (2016) noted that “Law and Justice has … packed the Constitutional Court, politicized the 
appointment of prosecutors, abolished court consent for state access to private internet accounts and brought public 
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broadcasting under direct government control.” Kovacs and Scheppele (2018) point out “the constitutional courts 
and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a 
separation of law and politics.” Chapman (2017) weighs in on issues relating to press freedom and notes:  
 “Poland has become a crucial battleground in the drive by authoritarian-minded leaders to gain control 
over political discourse and limit media pluralism.” 
 “The Law and Justice government has sought to control the media as part of a broader push to weaken 
checks and balances and silence independent voices. By rejecting the media’s independence, the 
government is deepening polarization within Poland.” 
 “The fate of media freedom in Poland will herald either the continued march of populist authoritarianism 
around the world or a turning of the tide and a new period of democratic resilience.” 
 “The EU and Poland’s allies, including the United States, should make clear that Poland’s best interests 
lie in respecting the media’s independence and allowing a diversity of views to flourish.” 
Supporters of PiS vehemently disagree. 
Jarosław Kaczyński, who had served as Prime Minister in 2006-2007, became the literal "face of the PiS" in 
2010, following the tragic death of his twin brother, Lech Kaczyński, in the Smolensk plane crash (Hunter, 2010). 
Lech Kaczynski, a former mayor of Warsaw, was at the time of his death the elected President of Poland 
(Sleszynski, 2006; Hunter, 2010). Observers note that while Jarosław Kaczyński does not hold any office or 
perform any official state function, he is the de facto leader of the country, exercising great influence on the 
government’s personnel and policies (Ascherson, 2016). As noted by Kosicki (2016), “He rose to power briefly a 
decade ago, promising to create a ‘Fourth Republic,’ to elevate the Catholic Church’s position in public life, to 
reinstitute Communist-era welfare guarantees, and—most provocatively—to expose the alleged skeletons in the 
closets of the Third Republic’s political and business elites.”  
PiS captured the Presidency in 2016 when PiS candidate Andrzej Duda surprisingly upset the incumbent 
Bronislaw Komorowski (Casey, 2015), who had, as Marshall of the Sejm, succeeded Lech Kaczynski upon his 
death. The current Prime Minister is Mateusz Morawiecki, the son of a well-known and respected Solidarity 
activist, Kornel Morawiecki, also from the PiS. PiS combines nationalism with social conservatism and enjoys the 
support of the powerful Polish Roman Catholic Church. Ramet (2016) notes that “the Church has taken advantage 
of the fall of communism to push its own social agenda, at times against the wishes of most Poles.” Zuk and Zuk 
(2019) also note the “growing gap between the clerical state and the increasingly secularized society.” 
PiS essentially supports a policy of "social redistribution" (Rzegocki & Partyka, 2017), including the 
introduction of a generous universal child-benefit program, seemingly recognizing Poland’s twin crises of low 
fertility and “mass emigration to other Western countries.” PiS stands as a self-described defender of Poland’s 
sovereignty, culture, values, and Catholic faith against various foreign and domestic enemies (see Zuk & Zuk, 
2019), including refugees, the LGBT community (Roache, 2019), political correctness, and the European Union. 
On the economic front, PiS has lowered the retirement age, which had been raised by the previous PO government 
in an attempt to shore-up Poland's retirement regime, and instead has provided additional payments to Polish 
pensioners. It has strong links with the Polish Roman Catholic Church (Zuk & Zuk, 2019), still a very influential 
institution in Poland, which exhibited a considerable clout in parliamentary elections from 1989 through 2010 and 
beyond (Kowalczyk, 2012). PiS continues to defend the coal-dependent Polish energy sector—as much as 81% of 
Poland’s electricity comes from coal (Sauer, 2018)—currying the favor (and votes) of heavily subsidized miners 
(Sauer, 2018) and others employed in the mining sector.  
In foreign policy, PiS is staunchly “anti-Russian” and favors strengthening and expanding political and 
economic ties with the United States (King, 2017), which it sees as the primary guarantor of Poland’s military 
security against Russia. Balcer, Buras, Gromadzki, and Smolar (2016, p. 2) write that “The most significant 
element of Poland’s foreign policy paradigm redefinition by PiS is based on a deep pessimism as regards the future 
of European integration” and sees foreign policy clearly as “secondary to domestic objectives.” Recently, PiS has 
enthusiastically endorsed the placement of an American military installation in Poland, which it has dubbed “Fort 
Trump.” It ranks as one of its major achievements ending the visa requirement for Polish citizens who wish to visit 
the United States as further proof of its close relationship with the United States and President Trump. As noted 
by Taylor (2018): “The White House calls the move an ‘important step in continuing to increase economic, security, 
cultural, and people-to-people connections between our two nations.’ Poland has pursued access to the program 
for decades, and with the announcement of its nominations, it looks as though it will finally be included.”  
On the economic front, PiS has promised to raise Poland's minimum wage to 4,000 zloty a month by 2023 
(approximately $1,000), almost doubling the present figure, and to provide two "extra" monthly pension payments 
to Polish retirees (Harper, 2019). PiS also pledged to protect the traditional family model and "Catholic values," 
to continue its reforms of the Polish judiciary, and also promised to “re-Polonise” and “take back control” of the 
media after its victory in last fall's parliamentary elections, in which PiS received 43.59% of votes—a higher 
percentage than any individual party has achieved in the entire post-communist period. This translated into 235 
seats, the same number as it had won in 2015. Because it had achieved a majority in the Sejm, PiS was able to 
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form a government without seeking the concurrence of any other parties or groupings in a coalition government. 
However, PiS does not have enough of a majority to seek to change the constitution on its own right, which would 
require a two-thirds majority in the Sejm. Surprisingly, in the fall parliamentary elections, PiS actually lost its 
previous majority in the Senate, winning 48 seats, with the number of opposition and opposition-aligned 
independent senators amounting to 52. 
In actuality, however, PiS governs Poland at the senior-partner in an informal conservative coalition, known 
as the United Right (Polish: Zjednoczona Prawica), formed between PiS, United Poland (Polish: Solidarna Polska), 
and the Agreement (Polish: Porozumienie), two smaller right-wing parties.  
 
3.3 Civic Coalition: Civic Platform (PO) 
PO is a center-right party, which governed Poland between 2007 and 2015. PO was formerly under the leadership 
of Donald Tusk, who left Polish electoral politics in 2014 to become the President of the European Council 
(Lykoshina, 2015). Recently, Tusk announced that he would not be a candidate in Poland's next Presidential 
election, acknowledging that he had accumulated "too much baggage" to be a viable candidate (Cienski, 2019).  
Interestingly, despite their more recent very public feuding, PO’s origins closely track those of PIS and can 
be traced to the political groupings in the immediate post-Solidarity period. Kaczynski and his allies have accused 
PO of being a part of the “post-communist establishment” that had exploited Poland’s transition, sacrificing the 
interests of ordinary Poles to alien values, and to the whims of the former nomenklatura and foreign business 
interests. In opposition to PiS, PO has moved more towards the center in Polish politics and represents a more 
traditional liberal economic position, supporting low taxes and individual entrepreneurship, the “rule of law” 
(Krygier, 2017), faith in the free market, and opposition to unnecessary government intervention in the economy. 
PO has incurred the wrath of more conservative Poles and the Roman Catholic Church, as it has adopted a 
moderately conservative approach on social issues. Abortion continues to be a flashpoint in Polish society and 
politics.  
PO supports Poland’s existing abortion “compromise," vigorously opposed by the Catholic Church, which 
has adopted an absolute opposition to all forms of abortion (Mishtal, 2015; Szelewa, 2016; Hussein, Cottingham, 
Nowicka, & Kismodi, 2018). (Abortion is illegal in Poland except in cases of rape, when the woman's life or health 
is in jeopardy, or if the fetus is irreparably damaged.) Despite being labeled as "liberal" by its conservative 
detractors, the current law is among the strictest laws in the European Union. PO has also announced limited 
support for same-sex civil unions, diversity, LGBT rights (O’Dwyer & Vermeersch, 2016), an independent media, 
and the environment. 
PO's junior parliamentary partner, Modern (Polish: Nowoczesna) may be considered as a traditional “liberal” 
party that was created in 2015 by former World Bank economist Ryszard Petru. Petru was replaced by current 
leader Professor Katarzyna Lubnauer. Modern likewise supports both liberal economic and social policies, but is 
now very much the junior partner in its coalition with PO. 
In reaction to PiS, PO has promised to "restore democracy and the rule of law," as well as promoting further 
European integration and respect for the “fundamental values of the European Union” (Hunter & Domanska, 2016; 
Wyrzykowski, 2018). It also promises to overturn the Sunday trading and shopping ban introduced by PiS 
(Underwood, 2017) and to restore state funding for IVF (in vitro fertilization) procedures, which was ended by 
PiS. PO has also pledged to eliminate coal from Poland’s energy mix by 2040 as part of its pro-environment agenda.  
In last fall's parliamentary elections, PO garnered 27.4 % of votes, giving them 134 seats in the Sejm, although 
in elections to the Senate, PO won 43 seats in its own right and joined with other opposition parties, with whom 
PO had made a pact not to stand against one another, winning an additional five seats. Four senators were elected 
as "officially independent." The Senate has the power to delay (but not to defeat) legislation enacted by the Sejm 
and to make it much harder for PiS to implement its more controversial changes through the legislative process.  
PO has suffered five successive election defeats since the start of 2015 (see Grabowski, 2019). There is a 
strong sense that PO has struggled to find a clear and consistent policy narrative since 2015 and is more widely 
known for the opposition to policies of PiS rather than for its own legislative proposals and agenda. 
 
3.4 The Left 
Following the failure of the Polish "left" to win any representation in parliament in the 2015 elections (generally, 
Kosicki, 2016), Poland’s three main left-wing parties chose to stand together in the 1999 parliamentary elections, 
ensuring they would pass the 8% electoral threshold. 
The Democratic Left Alliance (Polish: Sojusz Lewica Demokratycznej), or SLD, is today a centre-left party 
with many of its founders and some of its supporters tracing their roots to Poland’s former communist party. SLD 
actually achieved success in a “landslide victory” in the first completely free parliamentary elections of 1993 (Chan, 
K.K-L. (2007), and into the 1990s (March 1995-October 1997), and again from October of 2001 through October 
of 2005, when many Polish voters expressed their dissatisfaction with the nature and speed of promised reforms. 
[The same situation seems to have occurred in many of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern 
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Europe (Grzymala-Busse, 2002)]. SLD capitalized on the frustration of many Polish workers who has formed the 
backbone of the Solidarity movement, but who had reached what was termed as the "barrier of social endurance" 
(Hunter & Ryan, 1998, p. 9). Its open former-communist standard-bearer, Aleksander Kwasniewski, defeated 
Solidarity hero Lech Walesa in his bid for re-election to the Polish presidency in 1995, but largely governed Poland 
in a decidedly non-ideological basis. 
One of SLD's partners, Spring (Polish: Wiosna), was recently established by Robert Biedroń, a former mayor 
of Slupsk, and an open LGBT rights activist. Wiosna won 6% of the vote and three seats in the European Parliament 
in the elections for Polish representation in Brussels.  
A second grouping, Together (Polish: Razem), has been described by some observers as “the new left” in 
Poland, completely separate from any post-communist heritage. Lacking strong leadership, Razem failed to pass 
the 5% electoral threshold on its own, forcing it into its current alliance with SLD and other coalition partners. 
SLD ran on a platform decidedly to the left of the PO coalition (and certainly to the left of PiS), promising 
significant liberalization on the social front, including limiting Poland’s strict abortion law; improving access to 
contraception and sex education; and strengthening LBGT rights, including eventually introducing same-sex 
marriage. In keeping with its core "left" principles, SLD also pledged to expand social services by providing free 
nurseries, free meals for children at schools, and free public transport for the elderly. 
To the surprise of many observers, the SLD coalition received 12.56 % of votes in the parliamentary elections, 
which translated into 49 seats in the Sejm. The SLD claimed that the result constituted a significant victory, 
considering the fact that both the SLD and Together had failed to pass the 5% threshold in the previous 
parliamentary elections, and did not win any seats in the lower house or Sejm. 
Reports indicate that SLD and Wiosna are currently planning to merge into a single parliamentary caucus, 
adopting yet another new name, unknown at this date. Whatever structure eventually materializes, the "new left" 
consists of many "young, new faces" which hopes will attract Poles who have grown exhausted by continuing the 
infighting of Poland's most recent thirty-year past, advocating socially liberal policies and offering a decided 
alternative to PiS’s redistributionist policies, to which the opposition struggled to respond during the last 
parliamentary elections. Could the “left” actually make a comeback in Polish politics? Zuk (2017) doubts that the 
“left” will play any real important role in Polish politics and has dubbed its future success as a “non-alternative 
reality.”  
 
3.5 Other Parties and Groupings 
There are several other minor parties or electoral coalitions operating in Poland: Polish Coalition (Polish: Koalicja 
Polska), consisting of the Polish People’s Party (Polish: Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) or the PSL, and a new 
movement, Kukiz’ 15. 
The PSL is an agrarian-based, traditional Christian-democratic party whose support lies in rural Poland, 
especially the eastern part of Poland, where it directly competes with PiS for votes. The namesake of the PSL was 
one of the major political parties during both the inter-war period and era of communism in Poland. The PSL 
strongly advocates state protectionism in agriculture, and opposes abortion, same-sex civil unions, and euthanasia. 
Despite being very conservative on social issues, the PSL has found itself in several coalition governments—
surprisingly at times with the SLD and PO. 
Waldemar Pawlak, the former leader of PSL, twice served as Prime Minister, briefly in 1992, and again from 
1993 to 1995. Remerging once again from November 2007 to November 2012, Pawlak served as Deputy Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Economy. Pawlak remains as the only person who has held the office of Prime 
Minister twice since 1989. 
Since 2015, PSL has been led by Dr. Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, who, at 34 years of age at the time when 
he was chosen as the PSL leader, is regularly mentioned as a potential opposition candidate in next year’s 
presidential elections. 
PSL's partner, Kukiz’15, is not registered as a political party, but as an "association." It is essentially a populist, 
anti-establishment movement (Stanley & Czesnik, 2018), led by former punk rock star Paweł Kukiz. The group is 
composed of a disparate collection, including members of far-right groups, who were elected as MPs on the 
Kukiz’15 ticket in 2015. 
The Polish Coalition supports holding public referenda in order to gauge public support for creating laws—a 
specific demand of Kukiz. The Polish Coalition wants to end the taxation on pensions, and to make social insurance 
voluntary for entrepreneurs, which would certainly further complicate an already overburdened pension system, 
which according to Goclowski and Iglewski (2016, “Pension savings are a ticking time-bomb in Poland, which 
has one of the lowest birth rates in the European Union and also faces a mounting burden of paying out state 
pensions to people who did not save enough under communism.”  
The Polish Coalition garnered 8.55% in the parliamentary elections, which entitled them to 30 seats in the 
Sejm. The PSL also secured three seats in the Senate, effectively denying PiS its Senate majority. 
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3.5.1 Confederation Freedom and Independence (Polish: Konfederacja) 
Confederation is a far-right, “Eurosceptic” party, which brings together the National Movement (Polish: Ruch 
Narodowy), a nationalist group, and the followers of various right-wing libertarians (see Vasilopoulou, 2018). Its 
three main leaders are highly controversial figures on the Polish political scene, having variously expressed anti-
Semitic, Islamophobic, and decidedly misogynistic views. Confederation pledges to eliminate the income tax in 
Poland, as well as to make social insurance voluntary. (Social insurance is currently obligatory for all Polish 
students, business owners, and those who are formally employed in the Polish economy.) Confederation has 
adopted several political positions on the right, including opposition to Poland adopting the euro as its currency, 
opposing accepting migration from outside of the European Union, and opposing what it terms as the “LGBT and 
gender ideology.” Confederation has also pledged to liberalize gun access, to “protect” Poland from Jewish 
restitution claims, and to strengthen Christian values and the traditional family model. 
Reflecting the serious right-bent of Polish electoral politics, the 2019 election proved to be major success for 
Confederation, as it received 6.81% of the votes and gained 11 seats in the Sejm. Also reflecting the philosophy 
of the extreme right in Poland, one of its leaders summed up its main policies as: “We don’t want Jews, 
homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the European Union.”  Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Confederation’s leader, 
announced plans to introduce an “anti-LGBT law” that would “ban LGBT” from Poland, although Korwin-Mikke, 
a staunch opponent of the European Union, has at the same time “been associated with support for Putin’s Russia” 
(Bachrynowski, 2015). Confederation will also put forward measures to further restrict abortion (Grzymala-Busse, 
2016) and to prevent “the Holocaust industry” from using a new American law to profit from Jewish property 
restitution in Poland (see Wozniak, 2018). Sharon (2019) noted that “following the October (2019) parliamentary 
elections in Poland in which the Confederation Liberty and Independence won 6.8 percent of the vote, legislation 
was proposed which would ban and even criminalize the restitution of or compensation for heirless property.” 
Grzegorz Braun, the Confederation’s probable nominee in the next presidential election recently stated that “Jews 
have waged war against the Polish nation, and the whole Christian world, for centuries” (Sharon, 2019).     
 
4. Observations and Conclusions 
Curry (2014, p. 235) has correctly observed that “Poland was the first and one of the most successful transitions 
from a centralized communist state to a liberal, more Western-style democracy. During the European economic 
crisis, Poland’s economy maintained one of the highest growth rates in the European Union. Its political system 
stabilized.” The transition, at times, has not been an easy one (Hunter & Ryan, 2006). Curry (2014, p. 235) further 
noted that “the Polish political system has been a ‘work in progress’ for years, changing its constitution and laws 
in response to what did and did not work. As a result, Poland went from an uneasy coalition of former communist 
leaders, Solidarity activists, and experts in 1989, to a system in which the former the right and then the former 
communists battled for power, and finally, by the end of the first two decades of democracy, to a stable system 
with two dominant parties close to the center and a number of smaller parties.” Curry’s comments were possibly 
correctly in 2014—but events after 2015 may have changed this calculus, as Polish politics has taken a decided 
turn to the right. It will be important to monitor events closely in Poland to see which path Poland continues on.  
Will it be further liberalization in consort with other members of the European Union or will Poland embark on a 
path that further separates it from her European partners and roots?  
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APPENDIX II -PRIME MINISTERS OF POLAND (1989-) 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)   Law and Justice (PiS)   Civic Platform (PO) 
№ Name Took office Left office Party Coalition partner(s) 
Term in 
office  
1 
Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki 
24 August 
1989 
4 January 
1991  
Solidarity Citizens' 
Committee (KO‘S’) / 
Democratic Union (UD) 
ZSL–PZPR  
1 year, 
133 days  
2 
Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki  
4 January 
1991 
6 December 
1991  
Liberal Democratic 
Congress (KLD)  
ZChN–PC–SD  336 days  
3 Jan Olszewski  
6 December 
1991 
5 June 1992  Centre Agreement (PC) 
ZChN–PSL.PL-
PChD  
182 days  
4 Waldemar Pawlak  5 June 1992 10 July 1992 Polish People's Party (PSL)  None  35 days  
5 Hanna Suchocka 11 July 1992 
26 October 
1993  
Democratic Union (UD)  
KLD–ZChN–PChD–
PPPP–PSL.PL-PPG-
SLCh  
1 year, 
107 days  
6 Waldemar Pawlak  
26 October 
1993 
7 March 
1995  
Polish People's Party (PSL)  SLD–UP–BBWR  
1 year, 
132 days  
7 Józef Oleksy  
7 March 
1995 
7 February 
1996  
Social Democracy (SdRP)  PSL  337 days  
8 
Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz  
7 February 
1996 
31 October 
1997  
Social Democracy (SdRP)  PSL  
1 year, 
266 days  
9 Jerzy Buzek  
31 October 
1997 
19 October 
2001  
Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWS)  
UW–SKL–ZChN–
PPChD  
3 years, 
353 days  
10 Leszek Miller  
19 October 
2001 
2 May 2004  
Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD)  
UP–PSL  
2 years, 
196 days  
11 Marek Belka 2 May 2004 
31 October 
2005  
Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD)  
UP  
1 year, 
182 days  
12 
Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz 
31 October 
2005 
14 July 2006 Law and Justice (PiS)  SRP–LPR  256 days  
13 
Jarosław 
Kaczyński 
14 July 2006 
16 
November 
2007  
Law and Justice (PiS)  SRP–LPR  
1 year, 
125 days  
14 Donald Tusk 
16 
November 
2007 
22 
September 
2014  
Civic Platform (PO)  PSL  
6 years, 
310 days  
15 Ewa Kopacz 
22 
September 
2014 
16 
November 
2015  
Civic Platform (PO)  PSL  
1 year, 
55 days  
16 Beata Szydło  
16 
November 
2015 
11 December 
2017  
Law and Justice (PiS)  None  
2 years, 
25 days  
17 
Mateusz 
Morawiecki 
11 December 
2017 
Incumbent  Law and Justice (PiS)  None  
2 years, 
50 days  
 
 
